System for preventing unwanted access to information on a computer

ABSTRACT

A firewall device for preventing unwanted access to information on a computer is disclosed. In disclosed embodiments, the firewall device is managing traffic between a computer and an IP-compliant network. The computer may have a bundled application and associated information stored thereon. The firewall system includes a proxy agent cofigured to intercept incoming messages destined for the computer, and discard any incoming messages containing nested executable commands associated with the bundled application.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is a continuation of co-pending U.S. patent applicationSer. No. 09/564,922, filed May 4, 2000, which is a continuation of U.S.patent application Ser. No. 09/174,723, filed Oct. 19, 1998, now issuedas U.S. Pat. No. 6,061,798, which is a continuation of U.S. patentapplication Ser. No. 08/595,957, filed Feb. 6, 1996, now issued as U.S.Pat. No. 5,826,014.

BACKGROUND

The present invention relates to a system for protecting networkelements connected to a public network from access over the publicnetwork, and more specifically, to a firewall system for protectingnetwork elements connected to the Internet.

The Internet has experienced, and will continue to experience, explosivegrowth. As originally designed, the Internet was to provide a means forcommunicating information between public institutions, particularlyuniversities, in a semi-secure manner to facilitate the transfer ofresearch information. However, with the development and provision ofuser friendly tools for accessing the Internet, such as the World WideWeb (the Web), the public at large is increasingly turning to theInternet as a source of information and as a means for communicating.

The Internet's success is based, in part, on its support of a widevariety of protocols that allows different computers and computingsystems to communicate with each other. All of the Internet-compatibleprotocols, however, find some basis in the two original Internetprotocols: TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) and IP (InternetProtocol). Internet protocols operate by breaking up a data stream intodata packets. Each data packet includes a data portion and addressinformation. The IP is responsible for transmitting the data packetsfrom the sender to the receiver over a most efficient route. The TCP isresponsible for flow management and for ensuring that packet informationis correct. None of the protocols currently supported on the Internet,however, provides a great degree of security. This factor has hinderedthe growth of commercial services on the Internet.

The government, in learning of the Internet's limited transmissionsecurity capacity, has resorted to encoding secure messages usingcomplex encryption schemes. The government abandoned consideration ofthe Internet for high security information, relying instead on privatelyoperated government networks. The general public, without such concerns,has come to increasingly use the Internet. Furthermore, businesseshaving recognized the increasing public use of, and access to theInternet, have turned to it as a marketing mechanism through which todisseminate information about their products, services and policies.

A popular way for commercial institutions to supply information over theInternet is to establish a homepage on an Internet multi-media serviceknown as the World Wide Web. The World Wide Web (“Web”) provides auser-accessible platform that supplies information in text, audio,graphic, and video formats. Each homepage document can contain embeddedreferences to various media. A Web user can interactively browseinformation by responding to entry prompts nested in a screen within ahomepage. Web documents are accessed by using a TCP/IP compatibleprotocol called HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP). A user logged ontothe Internet can access a “Web site” by supplying the Web site's address(e.g., “http://srmc.com”). Entry of such an address establishes asession between the user and the Web site.

Provision of a Web homepage involves establishing a user accessible fileat a Web site. The Web site can be established on a computing system onthe premises of the business or institution providing the homepage, orby contracting to have the homepage built and supported on the computingfacilities of an Internet Service Provider (ISP). The assignee of thepresent application, Scientific Research Management Corporation (SRMC),is an Internet Service Provider.

Use of a company's computing system for support of a publicly accessiblesystem, such as a Web site, can present a threat to the company'sinternal systems that share the same computing platform, or areconnected to the publicly accessible computing platform. Furthermore, incases where sensitive information is transmitted over the Internet to acompany, such information is usually stored on the same computing systemthat is used for running the on-line Internet system. For instance, somebusinesses now publish homepage catalogs offering services and productsfor sale. A user can select products or services from a homepage catalogin an interactive session. After selecting the desired products orservices, the homepage may present a payment screen inviting the userenter credit card information. Handling of such information over apublic network such as the Internet, requires some measure of securityto prevent the information from being intercepted. However, a moreimportant consideration is maintaining the security of such informationonce it is received and stored in a computing system that is connectedto the Internet.

Most computer crime is not in the form of data interception, butinvolves a network intruder, or “hacker” entering a publicly-accessiblecomputing system and subverting security systems to access storedinformation. In the recent past there have been several publicized caseswhere hackers have stolen proprietary information from purportedlysecure computers over the Internet.

In many cases where a publicly accessible application, such as ahomepage, is set up on a business or institution's premises, it isgrafted onto an existing computing system. The existing system also maycontain other computing resources such as data bases, and/or internalnetwork systems that are not intended for public access. Provision of apublicly accessible on-line system, such as a Web server, on such asystem can provide a scenario that can be exploited by hackers who mayattempt to reach systems beyond the Web server using it, or othersystems bundled on the computing platform, as access paths. A company orinstitution may attempt to protect these surrounding systems by passwordprotecting them, or by concealing them from the public with a systemcalled a firewall.

Password protected systems are well known. However, a password promptannounces the presence of proprietary systems and may be an invitationfor a hacker to investigate further. Because password systems are widelyknown, they are somewhat susceptible to hackers who have developedtechniques for cracking, bypassing or subverting them. Usingconventional desktop computers, hackers have been known to decipherpasswords of reasonable lengths in a very short period of time.Provision of longer passwords may thwart a hacker's attempts, but at theexpense of user convenience.

The term “firewall” was coined in the computer network environment todescribe a system for isolating an internal network, and/or computers,from access through a public network to which the internal network orcomputers are attached. The purpose of a firewall is to allow networkelements to be attached to, and thereby access, a public network withoutrendering the network elements susceptible to access from the publicnetwork. A successful firewall allows for the network elements tocommunicate and transact with the public network elements withoutrendering the network elements susceptible to attack or unauthorizedinquiry over the public network. As used herein, the term “networkelement” can refer to network routers, computers, servers, databases,hosts, modems, or like devices that are typically associated with acomputer network.

One technique used by firewalls to protect network elements is known as“packet filtering.” A packet filter investigates address informationcontained in a data packet to determine whether the packet machine, fromwhich the packet originated, is on a list of disallowed addresses. Ifthe address is on the list, the packet is not allowed to pass.

One problem with packet filtering is that when unknown addressinformation is encountered in the filtering check (i.e., the packet'saddress is not on the list), the packet is usually allowed to pass. Thispractice of allowing unknown packets to pass is based on an Internetdesign philosophy that promotes the ease of information transfer. Hence,most firewall systems utilizing packet filtering operate on an “allow topass unless specifically restricted” basis. This practice is invokedwith the perception that the packet will eventually be recognized andappropriately routed down stream of the packet filter. However thispractice provides hackers with a means with which to bypass a packetfilter.

Hackers have developed a technique known as “source based routing,”“packet spoofing,” or “IP spoofing” wherein address information within afabricated packet is manipulated to bypass a packet filter. All networkelements that are addressable over the Internet have an addressconsisting of four octets separated by periods. Each of the octets is aneight bit sequence representing a decimal number between zero and 255. Ahost computer on the Internet might have an IP address: 19.137.96.1.Source based routing involves a hacker inserting an address of a machinethat resides “behind” a firewall into the source address field of afictitious packet. Such a packet can usually pass through a firewallbecause most firewalls are transparent to messages that originate frombehind the firewall, because the firewall assumes that such messages areinherently valid. To prevent this type of packet spoofing, the packetfilter's list of disallowed addresses includes the addresses of elementsresiding behind the firewall.

Another packet spoofing technique involves setting the“session.sub.—active” bit of a packet. By setting this bit in a packet,a packet filter receiving the packet assumes that a valid session hasalready been established, and that further packet filtering checks arenot necessary, thereby allowing the packet to pass. A spoofed packethaving its session.sub.—active bit set can contain an “establishconnection” message. Such a packet can be used to establish a sessionwith a machine behind the firewall.

Additional packet filtering techniques involve investigations of dataportions of packet to determine whether there are any suspect contents,and or investigations of suspect protocol designations. However, thedrawback of these and the aforementioned packet filtering schemes isthat, when used in combination, they are cumbersome. This practiceimpairs the speed with which packet filters do their job.

Conventional firewalls also may use an application gateway, or proxysystem. These systems operate on the basis of an application, or acomputing platform's operating system (OS), monitoring “ports” receivingincoming connection requests. A port is a numerically designated elementcontained in the overhead of a packet. A port number indicates thenature of a service associated with a packet. For example, a packetassociated with the Telnet service has a port number of 23, and the HTTPservice is assigned port number 80. These port number designations aremerely industry suggested, a packet containing a port designation of 23need not necessarily be associated with Telnet services. When the OS ormonitoring application receives a request on a particular port, aconnection is opened on that port. A program for managing the connectionis then initiated, and the firewall starts a gateway application, orproxy, that validates the connection request. However, such a system isvulnerable and inefficient because of the resource intensive nature ofthe processes involved.

Hackers have been known to inundate a port with large numbers ofslightly varying access requests in an attempt to slip a packet by anapplication gateway or proxy. This method of attack is known as a“denial of service attack.” The typical response to such an attack is tohave the OS shut down the targeted port for a period of time. Thisdefense response is necessitated by the inefficiency of conventionalport processing. The chain of processes associated with monitoring,managing, and verifying port connections is very inefficient. A denialof service attack can unduly burden system resources. Consequently, theconventional defense is to have the OS shut down the port for a periodof time. This security technique prevents entry into a system throughthat port and restores the availability of system resources. However, italso prevents a user behind the firewall from accessing the port thathas been shut down. Hence, this security measure is unacceptable.

Another problematic aspect of conventional firewall arrangements, from asecurity perspective, is the universal practice of combining a firewallwith other packages on a same computing system. This arises in twosituations. The first is where the firewall package, in and of itself,is a combination of applications. For example, Trusted InformationSystems' recently released Gauntlet application is a combination Webserver and firewall. The second situation is the aforementioned practiceof hosting publicly accessible and/or unrelated services on a samecomputing platform that supports the firewall. The services sharing theplatform with the firewall may include E-mail, Web servers, or even thesystem that the firewall is set up to protect (e.g., a database). Thissituation was discussed briefly above with respect to many companies'practice of grafting a firewall application onto their existing computersystems.

The provision of applications on top of, or in addition to, the firewallon a computing system provides a path through which a hacker can getbehind the firewall. This is done by using the unrelated applications toattack the firewall, or to directly connect with network elements beingprotected by the firewall. The firewall may fail to recognize the attackbecause the application being exploited by the hacker is authorized tocommunicate through the firewall. In addition, the firewall might not beable to protect against unexpected flank attacks from sharedapplications because it is set up specifically to monitor requests froma designated publicly accessible application. Alternatively, the sharedapplication may be used to completely bypass the firewall and attack, ordirectly connect to, a protected network element.

An example of a conventional firewall arrangement is depicted in FIG. 1.A host computer 100 communicates with an institutional computer system106 over a public network 102 through a router 104. A router is anetwork element that directs a packet in accordance with addressinformation contained in the packet. The institutional computer system106 supports a variety of applications including a Web server 108, andan E-mail system 114. A firewall system 110 also is hosted on theinstitutional computer 106 to protect a port 112 that connects aninternal network 116 to the institutional computer system 106. Theinternal network 116 may support communication between internalterminal(s) 118 and a database 120, possibly containing sensitiveinformation. Such a firewall system 110, however, is subject to attackin many ways.

A hacker operating the host computer 100 can utilize publicly accessibleapplications on the institutional computer system 106, such as the Webserver 108 or the E-mail system 114, to flank attack the firewall system110 or connect to the internal network port 112. The Web server 108 orthe E-mail system 114 may have authority to attach to and communicatethrough the firewall system 110. The hacker might be able to exploitthis by routing packets through, or mimicking these network elements, inorder to attach to, attack, or completely bypass the firewall system110.

Most conventional firewalls are transparent to packets originating frombehind the firewall. Hence, the hacker may insert a source address of avalid network element residing behind the firewall 110, such as theterminal 118, to a fictitious packet. Such a packet is usually able topass through the firewall system 110. Alternatively, the hacker can setthe session.sub.—active bit in the fictitious packet to pass through thefirewall 110. The packet can be configured to contain a messagerequesting the establishment of a session with the terminal 118. Theterminal 118 typically performs no checking, and assumes that such asession request is legitimate. The terminal 118 acknowledges the requestand sends a confirmation message back through the firewall system 110.The ensuing session may appear to be valid to the firewall system 110.

The hacker can also attempt to attach to the port 112. A conventionalapplication gateway system forms a connection to the port before thefirewall 110 is invoked to verify the authority of the request. Ifenough connection requests hit the port 112, it may be locked out for aperiod of time, denying service to both incoming request from the publicnetwork, and more importantly, denying access to the internal network116 for outgoing messages. It is readily apparent that conventionalfirewall systems, such as the one depicted in FIG. 1, are unacceptablyvulnerable in many ways.

It is readily apparent that the design and implementation ofconventional firewalls has rendered them highly vulnerable to hackerattack. What is needed is a true firewall system that overcomes theforegoing disadvantages and is resistant to hacker attack.

SUMMARY

The present invention overcomes the foregoing disadvantages by providinga firewall system that is resistant to conventional modes of attack. Afirewall in accordance with the present invention is a stand-alonesystem that physically resides between a point of public access and anetwork element to be protected. A firewall arrangement in accordancewith the invention operates on a computing platform that is dedicated tothe operation of the firewall. Such a dedicated firewall computingplatform is referred to herein as a “firewall box.” The firewall box isconnected to a protected network element by a single connection.Consequently, any communication from a publicly accessible networkelement to a protected network element must pass through the firewallbox. A network element, or elements, to be protected by the firewall areconnected to the backside of the firewall.

In a preferred embodiment the firewall box is a stand alone computingplatform dedicated to supporting a firewall application. No otherapplications, services or processes, other than those related to supportof the firewall application (e.g., an operating system), are to bemaintained on the dedicated firewall box.

The firewall application running on the firewall box is comprised of aplurality of proxy agents. In a preferred embodiment, individual proxyagents are assigned to designated ports to monitor, respond to andverify incoming access requests (i.e., incoming packets) received on theport. Port management by the OS or port management programs is limitedto simply assigning an appropriate proxy agent to an incoming accessrequest on a port. The assigned proxy agent immediately verifies theaccess request before a connection is formed. Using simple verificationchecks, the proxy agent determines the authority of the access request,quickly and efficiently discarding unauthorized requests without undulyburdening system resources. If the access request is authorized, theassigned proxy agent opens, and thereafter manages, the port connection.In this way, the proxy agent is able to repel denial of service attackswithout resorting to shutting down the port.

In a preferred embodiment, a proxy agent is assigned to a request basedon the service associated with an access request (e.g., the Telnet portnumber is indicated). Each proxy agent is thus protocol sensitive to theparticular service requirements of an incoming request and can respondwith appropriately formatted messages. However, if the protocol of anaccess request is not configured in accordance with the protocolnormally associated with that port, the request is discarded. If proper,the proxy agent can then initiate a set of verification checks to ensurethe authority and authenticity of the access request.

Verification tests performed by a proxy agent can involve any variety ofchecks, including, but not limited to: determinations of validdestination addresses; determination of valid user, or user/passwordinformation; validity of an access in view of the time period of theaccess; presence of executable commands within an access request; or anycombination of the latter, or like determinations. Such tests are notperformed in conventional firewall systems.

Upon confirming the validity of an incoming access request, a proxyagent initiates the connection to a network element indicated in theaccess request, or in response to a prompt issued to a user, on behalfof the incoming access request. This has the effect of shielding theidentity of network elements on each side of the firewall from a hackerwho taps a connection on either side of the firewall. The firewall alsocan be used in combination with a packet filtering scheme to protectagainst IP spoofing and source based routing.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The foregoing, and other objects, features and advantages of the presentinvention will be more readily understood upon reading the followingdetailed description in conjunction with the drawings in which:

FIG. 1 depicts a computer network arrangement having a conventionalfirewall arrangement.

FIG. 2 depicts an exemplary computer network arrangement including afirewall arrangement incorporating the present invention.

FIG. 3 depicts another exemplary computer network arrangement includinga firewall arrangement incorporating the present invention.

FIGS. 4A and 4B depict a flow diagram depicting an exemplary processincorporating the present invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

FIG. 2 depicts a block diagram of an exemplary system incorporating theinvention. Network elements in the form of a terminal 216 and a securedatabase 218 are connected to an internal network 214 that is protectedbehind a firewall 210. The connection 212 between the internal network214 and the firewall 210 is preferably the only connection between thesetwo elements. A publicly accessible computing system is connected to apublic network 202 through a router 204. A connection 208 between thefirewall 210 and the publicly accessible computing system 206 ispreferably the sole connection between the firewall 210 and the publiclyaccessible system 206. By providing the firewall 210 in this stand aloneconfiguration, any and all access from the public network 202 to theinternal network 214 must go through the firewall 210. Hence, a useroperating a host machine 200 who attempts to access the internal network214 via the public network 202 must go through the firewall 210. Thisarrangement is more robust than conventional firewall systems that aresusceptible to being bypassed either physically or through applicationssharing the firewall computing platform.

In preferred embodiments of the invention, the firewall 210 runs on adedicated firewall box. That is, the computer upon which the firewall210 is running, is dedicated to the firewall application. The processes,programs and applications running on the firewall computing platform arethose involved with firewall processes, or their support (i.e., thecomputer's operating system). Consequently, there is reduced risk of thefirewall being bypassed through applications sharing the firewall'scomputing platform. The addition of other, unrelated, applications tothe firewall box merely compromises the integrity of the firewall.

The firewall 210 application is comprised of a variety of access requestvalidation programs referred to herein as “proxy agents.” Proxy agentsinvestigate incoming requests that seek to access network elementsresiding behind the firewall 210. The nature of incoming access requestscan vary according to a particular port, or service (e.g., HTTP, Telnet,File Transfer Protocol (FTP)) that the incoming request seeks to attachto. Accordingly, the firewall 210 application assesses thecharacteristics of an incoming request and assigns an appropriate proxyagent tailored to the particular protocol and verification requirementsof that incoming access request. In a preferred embodiment, there is adesignated proxy agent for each port. The proxy agent assigned to a portperforms all of the verification processes and management of the portwithout involving the operating system, or a port manager (as inconventional systems). Because it is dedicated to a particular port, aproxy agent is capable of providing a more efficient handling of anincoming request from both a protocol and a verification standpoint. Theproxy agent makes an immediate verification check of an access requestbefore initiating a port connection. If the access is deemed suspect, itis immediately discarded The use of proxy agents is more efficient thanconventional chained processes involving OS based verification routinesand port management programs that are generic to incoming accessrequests. By immediately checking for and discarding suspect packets,the proxy agent is capable of resisting denial of service attackswithout having to shut down the port.

In accordance with another aspect of exemplary embodiments of theinvention, a proxy agent can include a tailored set of verificationtests. The rigorousness of the tests can be dictated by thecharacteristics of the access request. For instance, the source addressof an access request can be investigated to determine whether therequest is suspect or credible. An inherently reliable request mayrequire only a minimum of verification before being connected. While asuspect request may require enhanced verification. Access requestverification can include analysis of: source host machine and sourceuser information; destination host machine and destination userinformation; and/or time of day analysis. These or other tests can beinteractive in nature and prompt a source user to enter user/passwordinformation. In some cases a user may be required to enter a validdestination machine address or ID. In accordance with exemplaryembodiments of the invention any combination of the foregoing, or other,tests can be performed by a given proxy agent depending on theverification requirements of a particular incoming access request.

A more detailed depiction of an exemplary system in accordance with thepresent invention is shown in FIG. 3. The figure illustrates a networkscenario involving communication over a public network 306, such as theInternet. An institutional service provider 310 is attached to thepublic network 306 through a router 308. The institutional serviceprovider 310 has a publicly accessible network 312. A user 300 operatinga host computer 302 can access the publicly accessible network 312through the public network 306 (via routers 304 and 308, respectively).

The institutional service provider 310 may be an ISP that developssoftware on internal computers 324 and 326 for distribution and sale.Free software can be supplied to users who access a public Web server314 on the internal, publicly accessible, network. The institutionaluser 330 also may provide information about its products or services byestablishing a home page on the publicly accessible Web server 314. Thepublicly accessible network 312 also may have a public E-mail system316. Authorized subscribers may be permitted to access proprietarysoftware offered on a protected Web server 322 by accessing theinstitution's internal network 328. The internal network 328 also canhave a secure E-mail system 320 for internal communication. The internalnetwork 328 is protected from public access by a firewall 318incorporating the present invention.

The firewall 318 permits the internal network 328 to be attached to thepublic network 306 (through the publicly accessible network 312) withoutrendering the secure network 328 open to public access. The firewall318, in accordance with preferred embodiments of the invention,physically separates the publicly accessible network 312 from theinternal network 328. Consequently, all communications attempting toaccess the internal network 328, or any network elements attachedthereto, must pass through the firewall 318. To secure it from direct(i.e., keyboard) access, the firewall 318 is preferably maintained in asecure location on the premises of the institution 310.

The firewall 318 can run on a general purpose computer. Such a computer,in accordance with preferred embodiments, is a stand alone machine, orfirewall box, dedicated to the firewall application. The addition ofother programs to the firewall box merely undermines the strength of thefirewall 318. Such additional programs can be used to bypass, or attachto and attack the firewall 318.

The firewall application comprises a plurality of proxy agents that areassigned to investigate and handle an incoming access requests. A proxyagent is preferably assigned in accordance with a port numberdesignation indicated in a request. The assigned proxy agent processesthe access request, forms the connection, if verified, and manages thecompleted connection. A designer can dictate what set of verificationtests are to be run on a particular incoming request. For instance, anassigned proxy agent can first check to ensure that the protocol of theaccess request matches that of the indicated port. If there is adiscrepancy, the request is denied. A next check can involveinvestigation of a source address (i.e., the host machine from which theaccess inquiry originated) of the access request. This permits the proxyagent to make an initial assessment of the authenticity of the request.If a particular source has a higher probability of generating suspectpackets (e.g., an unknown university computer) a proxy agent canoptionally invoke a more rigorous series of verification tests. However,if the source is inherently secure (e.g., a firewall protected machineat a company's headquarters communicating with their R&D site) the proxyagent might proceed directly to connecting the incoming request with adestination host machine. Once the source is determined, the proxy agentcan run an appropriate combination of verification checks suited to theintegrity of the request as indicated by its source. In the event that alegitimate user is accessing a protected network element using suspectcomputer (e.g., a visiting professor logging on to a university's hostcomputer rather than his or her office computer) it may be advantageousto allow such a user through, but only after a more rigorous set ofinteractive verification tests. However, the packet source address neednot necessarily dictate the particular combination of verification testsperformed by the proxy agent. A proxy agent can have a fixed set ofverification tests based on the port designation. The particularselection of verification checks is discretionary. Several such checksare described below.

Source address verification can be based on a check of the validity ofon or more specific addresses, or, on a range of address values (e.g.,the first octet has a value of between zero and 100). Such a checkinvolves a determination of whether a host source address of an incomingpacket comports with a list of authorized or unauthorized addresses, oris within a designated range. If the source address is not on the list,the packet is discarded. Referring back to FIG. 3, in the event that theexternal user 300 attempts to contact a network element behind thefirewall 318, the proxy agent can check the source address of the hostcomputer 302. If the proxy agent determines that the host computer 302does not have an authorized address, the request originating from thehost computer 302 is discarded.

A second check can be used to determine the authority of an accessrequest based on the identity of a user seeking to gain access. This mayinvolve interactively prompting the user 300 to enter either a username, or a user/password combination. Because the proxy agent isprotocol sensitive, it is designed to issue prompts in accordance withthe format indicated by the port number of the incoming access request.A particular user may have limited access, in which case the user may beprompted to enter the address of the destination machine to be accessed.If the proxy agent determines that the user is not authorized to accessthe requested destination machine, the user can be re-prompted to enteranother destination machine, or the request can be discarded altogether.

A third check can be performed to determine whether the time periodduring which an access request is being made is authorized in and ofitself, or for a particular user, source address, or destination addressindicated in the request. For example, the check can permit access to acertain class of network elements during certain periods (e.g., between7:00 am and 5:00 pm U.S. pacific standard time). The time period checkcan include any combination of time of day, day of week, week of month,month of year, and/or year.

A fourth check can be invoked to determine whether the destinationaddress indicated by an access request is authorized. This check can beperformed by examining packet destination address information, orpossibly by prompting a user to enter the information. For example, inFile Transfer Protocol (FTP) requests, the user may be required to enterthe destination address (e.g., “usemame@host”) in response to a promptgenerated by the assigned proxy agent.

A proxy agent can also run tests that intercept and discard any messagesthat attempt to initiate a process on the firewall 318 itself. Forexample, a conventional system having bundled applications may includean application such as SendMail. SendMail, in addition to providing maildelivery, also contains features for collecting and tracking source anddestination information of mail messages. The information derived by ahacker through execution of such SendMail commands can be used to gainaccess to secure network elements. Hence, a proxy agent in accordancewith the invention can include, within its set of tests, a check forferreting out and discarding packets having nested executable commands.A firewall incorporating the invention can, however, facilitate thecommunication of normal electronic messages. Hence, valid mail can bepassed through the firewall 318 to an internal E-mail system 320 ifotherwise authorized.

The checks described do not represent an exhaustive list of availableverification checks. They merely represent a variety of accessvalidation checks and are described to assist in describing exemplaryembodiments of the invention. The particular combination of tests isdiscretionary. Other checks can be added as deemed fit or necessary fora particular scenario.

After a proxy agent successfully completes its set of one or moreverification tests, the proxy agent initiates a connection request tothe destination machine (and port) on behalf of the incoming accessrequest. The purpose of this practice is to maintain anonymity on eachside of the firewall. A party tapping either of the connections enteringor exiting the firewall only “sees” the elements on each side of thetap, but not those beyond the tap.

In accordance with another aspect of exemplary embodiments of theinvention, security is supplemented by performing packet filtering onincoming access request packets. Such packet filtering can be providedeither by the operating system of the firewall box, or by a router, suchas router 308. In accordance with preferred embodiments, the packetfiltering is directed to eliminating source based routing. Therefore,the packet filter maintains a list of addresses corresponding to networkelements residing behind the firewall 318. If any incoming accessrequest has a source address of a network element behind the firewall318, that packet will be intercepted and discarded.

FIGS. 4A and 4B depict a flow diagram of an exemplary process foranalyzing an access request received at the firewall 318 of FIG. 3. Theprocess described is merely exemplary, and any combination of checks orsteps may be performed in accordance with a selected combination ofchecks. Furthermore, the order of step execution can be altered asneeded for a particular scenario.

Consider the situation where the user 300 in FIG. 3 is authorized toaccess the Web server 322 that resides behind the firewall 318. Toaccess the Web server 322, the user 300, operating the host computer302, first logs onto to a public network (step 400), that is compatiblewith TCP/IP protocols. To access the Web server of the institution 310,the user 300 enters an appropriate address (step 402), such as“http:.backslash..backslash.webwho.com”. The access request is receivedby a router 304, which forwards the message to the Internet 306. TheInternet may forward the message through a series of routers and presentit to a router 308 that services the institution 310.

Because the access request seeks to access a destination addressresiding behind the firewall 318, the access request message ispresented to the firewall 318 (step 404). In accordance with anexemplary embodiment, a proxy agent running on the firewall 318 isassigned to the access request in accordance with a preliminary analysisof the port number designation within the packet representing the accessrequest (step 406). In this case, port number 80 (HTTP) would ordinarilybe designated in the request. The assessment also can involve adetermination of whether the service indicated by the port numbercomports with the contents of the request (step 408). That is, does therequest indicate one service (port number) while being formatted foranother. If there is disparity, the access is denied (step 410).

The proxy agent can then analyze a source address to determine whetherthe host computer 302 from which the message originated is authorized toaccess the secure Web server 322 (step 412). As described above, thischeck can be used to optionally invoke a more rigorous set ofverification checks if the source is unknown or suspect. This assessmentcan involve a comparison of the source address with a list of authorizedor unauthorized addresses maintained by the proxy agent (step 414). Inthe exemplary case here, if the source address is not authorized (i.e.,the source address is not on the list), the access request is denied(step 416). The extent to which a proxy agent verifies the validity ofan access request can vary. It should be noted that in some cases, aproxy agent may need do little more than verify address informationbefore initiating a connection to the destination device on behalf ofthe source host. Alternatively, if a source address is suspect, or aproxy agent's set of checks is fixed, the proxy agent can performadditional checking.

In the present exemplary scenario the access request message is furtheranalyzed to determine whether the access request is being receivedduring an authorized time period, such as a time of day (step 418). Ifthe time of day during which the access request is received is notauthorized, the connection request is denied (step 420). The time of dayassessment can be tailored for specified users, source host machines,and/or IP addresses. For example, to prevent evening hacking by users inCanada, North, and South America, such users may be denied access otherthan during normal U.S. business hours. A user in India, however,operating during Indian daylight hours, may be allowed to access thesystem during U.S. evening hours.

A proxy agent also can assess whether user or user/password informationis necessary to gain access (step 422). If not, the proxy agent caninitiate the connection (step 424). If the information is required, theproxy agent prompts the user with an appropriately formatted message toenter a usemame and/or password information (step 426). The user nameand/or password information is checked (step 428). If an unauthorizeduser name is entered, or the password is invalid, the access request isdenied (step 430). If a valid user name, or user/password combination isentered, the proxy agent can make further assessments, if deemednecessary or appropriate, to determine whether the host machine 302 isauthorized to access the particular destination (e.g. Web server 322)(step 432). If not authorized, the access is denied (step 434). Anadditional proxy agent check can determine whether the particularnetwork element to which the user 300 is attempting to gain access to isavailable to the particular user (step 436). If not authorized, theaccess request is denied (step 438).

If after the proxy agent has completed its set of tests it is determinedthat the access request is authorized, the proxy agent initiates aconnection to the Web server 322 on behalf of the source machine 300(step 440). Because the firewall forms a connection (using a proxyagent) following the completion of validation checks associated with theproxy agent's test set, the firewall functions as a Bastion host, orfirewall server, on behalf of the access request source. By using thefirewall as a Bastion host, or firewall server, to act on behalf of theuser accessing the secure network 328, the identity of internal networkelements is not revealed because the firewall 318, acting as anintermediary, shields the identity of the network elements for whom itis acting on behalf of. All the external user sees, in terms ofaddresses, is the firewall. If an internal connection is tapped onto, avalid source address or user identity is not available to the hacker asthe firewall 318 appears to be the source of the connection. Hence, afirewall arrangement in accordance with the invention provides two-waytransparency.

Another aspect of an exemplary embodiment of the invention involvessending an “out-of-band” system message in response to a usemame orusername/password combination provided by a user. Such a system involvescommunicating a password, or password portion, back to a user on acommunication medium other than the computer network being used. Theuser enters the information received by out-of-band means to complete alogon process. For example, a user can be prompted to enter theirusemame and the first half of a password. The system receiving thisinformation, upon verifying it, sends back the remaining half of thepassword to the user by automatically generating a phone call to abeeper provided to the user. The beeper's display indicates theremaining password portion, which is then entered by the user tocomplete the logon. The identity of the user is thereby authenticated. Ahacker does not possess the means to receive the out-of-band response(i.e., the beeper). The password, or password portion sent back to theuser by out-of-band means can be a random number generated by thefirewall system.

Another aspect of exemplary firewall systems operating in accordancewith the invention is that all processes, including proxy agents,running on the firewall, operate in a “daemon mode.” When a computeroperating system receives a request to perform a task it will open up ajob and designate a corresponding job number in order to provide andmanage resources associated with that job. When the task is completedthe operating system designates the job for closure. However, the actualclosure of the job and removal of the corresponding job number does notalways take place immediately because it is considered to be a lowpriority task. This occasionally leaves an idle job open on the systemawaiting closure. Hackers have learned that they can exploit such anidle job, reactivate its status, and access resources available to thejob. By operating in a daemon mode, the operating system of the firewallbox immediately shuts down jobs following the completion of designatedtasks.

When a computer upon which the firewall is running is operating in aUNIX environment, there are UNIX-specific security measures that can beinvoked. One such security measure is the “changeroot” feature. A “root”user is a user having high levels of access to files branching from a“root directory.” If a hacker can access a root directory, the hackermay be able to access the files hierarchically emanating from the rootdirectory. In accordance with another aspect of a secure database systemincorporating the present invention, all jobs running on the firewallsystem and on the secure database system are preceded by a “changeroot”command to change the identity of the root directory. A new rootdirectory is created by execution of this command that can be used fortransaction-specific purposes. This new directory does not have accessto any of the original file directories branching from the original rootdirectory. Consequently, if a hacker is able to access informationassociated with a job, corresponding root directory data will beuseless.

Another aspect of a system in accordance with the invention is the useof aliases by the firewall when addressing machines residing behind thefirewall. A machine behind the firewall can be addressed by the firewallaccording to an alias of its actual IP address. Hence, if a hacker issomehow able to tap the firewall, any addresses detected by the hackercorresponding to machines attached to the backside of the firewall willbe fictitious.

An additional security feature that can be provided in the firewallsystem is a transaction log. Such a log gathers information associatedwith any access request message seeking to connect to or inquire aboutnetwork elements residing behind the firewall. Information gathered insuch a transaction log may include, but is not limited to, the sourceaddress (what is the identity of the machine from which the requestoriginated), the IP address (which Internet port system did the requestoriginate over), the destination address (who is the request trying toreach), time of access, and/or the identity of user (who is using thesource machine). This information can facilitate the identity of ahacker if the hacker's activities require legal attention.

The exemplary scenarios described above are directed primarily tosituations where outside users are attempting to access network elementsresiding behind a firewall. It should be noted, however, that a firewallin accordance with the present invention also can be utilized to monitorand control packet traffic originating from behind a firewall, allowingand disallowing connection based upon predetermined rules. Hence, afirewall incorporating the invention also can be used to control what,where, who, how and when a user behind the firewall can access theoutside world. This can be done in addition to monitoring andcontrolling incoming traffic.

Because exemplary embodiments involve the operation of computingsystems, an exemplary embodiment of the invention can take the form of amedium for controlling such computing systems. Hence, the invention canbe embodied in the form of an article of manufacture as a machinereadable medium such as floppy disk, computer tape, hard drive disk, CDROM, RAM, or any other suitable memory medium. Embodied as such, thememory medium contains computer readable program code, which causes acomputing system upon which the firewall system is running to functionor carry out processes in accordance with the present invention.

An exemplary application of the invention has been described protectingan internal network. However, one skilled in the art will readilyappreciate and recognize that the firewall system or method of operationin accordance with the invention can be applied in any scenariorequiring the protection of network elements that are attached to apublicly accessible medium, such as the Internet. The invention providesthe benefit of attaching a system to a public network with reducedapprehension of that system being compromised over the public network.

The invention has been described with reference to particularembodiments. However, it will be readily apparent to those skilled inthe art that it is possible to embody the invention in specific formsother than those of the embodiments described above. Embodiment of theinvention in ways not specifically described may be done withoutdeparting from the spirit of the invention. Therefore, the preferredembodiments described herein are merely illustrative and should not beconsidered restrictive in any way. The scope of the invention is givenby the appended claims, rather than by the preceding description, andall variations and equivalents which fall within the range of the claimsare intended to be embraced therein.

1. A system for preventing unwanted access to information on a computercomprising: a computer including at least one bundled application andassociated information stored thereon; a firewall system for managingtraffic between said computer and an IP-compliant network; and thefirewall system including a proxy agent configured to intercept incomingmessages, and discard any message that contain nested executablecommands associated with said bundled application.
 2. The system ofclaim 1, wherein said bundled application comprises an email programresiding on said computer.
 3. The system of claim 2, wherein saidexecutable command comprises a command to send email from said emailprogram to the sender of said incoming message.
 4. The system of claim2, wherein said information comprises one of a source or destinationaddress information regarding said email destination application.
 5. Thesystem of claim 3, wherein said firewall system is further configured tolog information regarding said incoming messages in a transaction log.6. The system of claim 5, wherein said information comprises one of thesource address of said incoming message.
 7. The system of claim 3,wherein email messages not containing nested commands are allowed topass normally through said system.
 8. An apparatus for preventingunwanted access to information on a computer comprising: firewall meansfor managing traffic between a computer and an IP-compliant network; andproxy agent means operable within said firewall means for interceptingand discarding incoming messages that contain nested executable commandsassociated with a bundled application of said computer.
 9. The apparatusof claim 8, wherein said bundled application comprises an email programresiding on said computer, and wherein said executable command comprisesa command to send email from said email program to the sender of saidincoming message.
 10. The apparatus of claim 8, wherein said informationcomprises one of a source or destination address information regardingsaid email destination application.
 11. The apparatus of claim 8,further comprising means for logging information regarding said incomingmessages in a transaction log.
 12. The system of claim 8, furthercomprising means for allowing email not containing nested commands topass normally through said system.
 13. A firewall device for preventingunwanted access to information on a computer comprising: a firewalldevice for managing traffic between said computer and an IP-compliantnetwork; and the firewall system including a proxy agent configured tointercept incoming messages destined for a computer having a bundledapplication and associated information stored thereon; and wherein saidproxy agent being configured to discard any incoming messages thatcontain nested executable commands associated with said bundledapplication.
 14. The device of claim 13, wherein said bundledapplication comprises an email program residing on said computer. 15.The device of claim 14, wherein said executable command comprises acommand to send email from said email program to the sender of saidincoming message.
 16. The device of claim 14, wherein said informationcomprises one of a source or destination address information regardingsaid email destination application.
 17. The device of claim 15, whereinsaid firewall device is further configured to log information regardingsaid incoming messages in a transaction log.
 18. The device of claim 15,wherein email messages not containing nested commands are allowed topass normally through said system.